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Ambiguity and polysemy as rhetorical resources in knowledge disputes: 
The struggle over the interpretation of Kuhn in organisation studies 
 
In organisation studies (OS), the literature is not short of attempts to delineate the contours 
and internal boundaries of the field. Some debates revolve around whether or not authors 
should use Thomas Kuhn’s (1962/1996) concepts to do so, and whether or not they are being 
faithful to the original ideas. I propose in this paper that examining some usages of the notion 
of paradigm can not only inform future conceptualisations, but shed light on the politics of 
attempts to delineate and police the field.  
The question “how is the idea of paradigm used in OS, and to what purposes?” is addressed 
in four steps. First, I discuss the diversity of representational practices. Representations of the 
field differ in at least two respects: the dimensions underpinning the paradigms that are 
delineated, and the relationship those paradigms have with Kuhn’s. I then consider the 
reception of Kuhn’s notion of paradigm in OS and in the social sciences in general, showing 
the lack of consistency in how the notion is appropriated—something enabled by its ambiguity 
and polysemy. Third, I discuss the role of ambiguity in scientific disputes, and propose that 
ambiguity is a useful rhetorical resource in a wider struggle for intellectual dominance of the 
field. The thesis developed is that the definition of ‘paradigm’, rather than being merely an 
object of philosophical discussion, is an important site of contestation. The consequence of 
such a view is that the relationship between paradigms can be seen as not much other than the 
reification of the definition that is used. I illustrate this idea in the fourth part with a reading of 
Donaldson (1995) and McKinley and Mone (1998). 
To look specifically at the ‘paradigm debate’ in OS is not to ignore that similar debates are 
also happening in neighbouring fields.1 Whilst I am interested in the case of OS because it is 
the field I belong to, the relative longevity of the debate means that a lot of material is available 
to the analyst, and that positions are generally well articulated and documented. 
The diversity of representational practices 
The delineation of OS proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979) is so widely established that 
one can hardly think of the idea of paradigms without thinking of their 2x2 matrix, which 
articulates the interplay of assumptions about the nature of social science with assumptions 
                                                           
1 For example, for an account of debates in marketing theory and consumer research, see Tadajewski 
(2014). In accounting research, see Lukka (2010). 
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about the nature of society (Figure 1). Whilst earlier classification (e.g. Clegg & Dunkerley, 
1977; Silverman, 1970) used simple binary oppositions, subsequent ones often adopted the 2x2 
matrix format – something described by Deetz (1996) as “spatially and visually convenient” 
(198). Examples include Astley and Van de Ven’s (1983) ‘four views of organisations and 
management’, a matrix articulating the interplay between levels of analysis and orientation 
toward agency; Rao and Pasmore’s (1989) ‘knowledge-interest nexus’, and Deetz’s (1996) 
‘contrasting dimensions from the metatheory of representational practices’. Other authors 
abandoned the 2x2 format and either kept the notion of paradigm (e.g. Hassard & Cox, 2013) 
or abandoned it altogether (Reed, 1999 proposed six analytical narratives)  
 (PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE) 
This brief overview suffices to illustrate that existing schemes are diverse and underpinned 
by widely different principles. One could also design entirely new classifications inspired by 
alternative dimensions. For example, Connell and Nord (1996) argue that in general, 
interpretations of knowledge disputes focus too much on epistemological and ontological 
assumptions, and insufficiently on differences in interests and values. Parker (2000) similarly 
suggests that discussions around epistemology and ontology marginalise questions of value 
and ethics. Classifications can emphasise differences at the expense of similarities, but they 
can also do the opposite (Bailey & Eastman, 1994). 
It is useful to draw a parallel with what happened in sociology, where Eckberg and Hill 
(1979), after looking at numerous delineations of sociology found that, “There are almost as 
many views of the paradigmatic status of sociology as there are sociologists attempting such 
analyses” (925). This is because, they say, authors confuse notions of ‘paradigm’ and 
‘perspective’: 
When used by sociologists, the term [paradigm] comes most often to mean no more than 
a general theoretical perspective, or even, as we shall see, a collection of elements from 
several more or less distinct perspectives. As such, the paradigm spoken of by sociologists 
are nebulous, shifting entities, indicating whatever one wishes them to indicate, and are 
limited only by the theorist’s imagination. (929) 
Eckberg and Hill (1979) suggested that sociologists found Kuhn’s ideas appealing because it 
furthered the legitimacy of the discipline by presenting it as a science similar to any natural 
science. Using ‘paradigms’ while really meaning ‘perspectives’ enabled sociologists to claim 
legitimacy without having to take seriously the implications of Kuhn’s argument. By 
generating paradigms arbitrarily, “[theorists] miss both the cognitive and the structural aspects 
of the paradigm concept” (932).  
 3 
 
Let us therefore ask these questions: how did OS scholars relate to Kuhn’s work? And how 
did this compare to elsewhere in the social sciences? 
The reception of Kuhn in organisation studies and in the social sciences 
Commentators have often debated whether or not Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) notion of 
paradigm is aligned with Kuhn’s. For example, Donaldson (1985) said that it fundamentally 
misinterprets Kuhn, exaggerating the extent to which Kuhn’s framework is a 
phenomenological one. Kuhn, with his stress on the cumulative process of study, theory 
construction and empirical testing is much more aligned with conventional philosophies of 
science than is assumed. For Donaldson, this is not a reformulation of the philosophy of science 
but an enrichment of the conventional accounts offered by authors like Popper (1945) or 
Toulmin (1962). Burrell and Morgan also exaggerated the extent to which paradigms are 
mutually exclusive (Donaldson stresses that for Kuhn, communication between paradigms is 
possible through processes of translation, persuasion and conversion). Finally, Donaldson 
rejected Burrell and Morgan’s notion of paradigm incommensurability, claiming that it is 
assumed rather than demonstrated. This assumption hides and protects a contentious premise 
– that different views about ontology and epistemology prevent the adjudication of competing 
knowledge-claims. In Donaldson’s view, Burrell and Morgan have used Kuhn’s concepts as 
symbolic resources to produce statements that cannot be challenged. Tit for tat, Jackson and 
Carter (1991) responded that Donaldson is wrong to infer equivalence between Kuhn’s notion 
of paradigms and Burrell and Morgan’s, and that, “apart from the use of the word paradigm 
and the fact that both texts are concerned with the production of knowledge, the two theories 
are markedly different” (114). Indeed, Burrell and Morgan did dissociate the two notions of 
paradigms explicitly (1979: 35-36n1) and did refer to different theoretical influences (1979: 
37n4). 
*** 
Whether common usages of the notion of paradigm have anything to do with Kuhn’s ideas 
is a question that is also meaningful in the wider context of the social sciences, where a 
common view is that the work of Kuhn has been generally misused (Fuller, 2003). Kuhn was 
careful to avoid making broad claims that would encompass the social sciences, and whenever 
discussing anything specific to the social sciences, he leaned on the side of caution. Wondering 
whether an increasing number of the social sciences specialities could ever find a paradigm 
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that would support the ‘normal, puzzle-solving research’ found in the natural sciences, Kuhn 
(1991/2000) said: “About the answer to that question, I am totally uncertain” (222). 
A comprehensive account of the reception of Kuhn shows that instances of alleged 
misappropriation of Kuhn’s works abound. Maasen and Weingart (2000) conducted a content 
analysis of a large body of citations of Kuhn, showing not only the enormous variation of 
contexts in which Kuhn’s work has been appropriated, but also the variations in the 
interpretation of his work. From a survey of texts citing Structure over the period ranging from 
1974 to 1997, they observed several patterns of citations. Here I underline five of them relevant 
to this analysis.  
1) There is no limit to the domains of application of Kuhn’s ideas. Kuhn’s Structure is cited 
in various contexts, many of which are remote from Kuhn original focus: nursing, education, 
wine expertise, theology, etc. Maasen and Weingart conclude: “whatever limitations of the 
applicability Kuhn himself had in mind does not in any way prevent others from ignoring them” 
(78-79). They add: “Kuhn’s conceptual framework is not only applied to an immense array of 
thematic contexts far beyond anything ever imagined of intended by its author, but also in 
contradiction to and in defiance of his original definitions” (88). 
2) Most of the references to Kuhn are affirmative and non-critical. Kuhn’s ideas are taken 
for granted without necessarily any discussion or examination. Kuhn is cited simply as an 
authority in order to justify a given position. Critical references appear sometimes, but they are 
rare and confined to very specialized discussions. 
3) Kuhn is used to legitimise antithetical positions. Readings of Structure are used to 
legitimise two diametrically different positions. Some authors use Kuhn to promote the 
overthrowing of the orthodoxy of their field. This ‘radical’ interpretation of Kuhn depicts 
science as being made of distinct competing paradigms, and enable authors to advocate a 
pluralistic view of science that legitimises the existence of heterodox perspectives. Other 
authors rely on Kuhn to legitimise the scientific status of their field by identifying the presence 
of a paradigm, which is taken as a sign of scientificity. This ‘orthodox’ reading of Kuhn enables 
authors to argue that new theories should be integrated theoretically to the orthodox body of 
works in order to restore paradigm unity. Maasen and Weingart note that in general, the 
‘radical’ interpretation of Kuhn tends to rely more on a metaphorical borrowing of Kuhn’s 
notion, and there seems to be a greater distance between the realm of application of Kuhn’s 
work and the domain the concepts are applied to. The ‘orthodox’ interpretation tends to rely 
on a more direct and literal reading. 
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4) Over time, references become increasingly summarily. Superficial and uncritical uses of 
Kuhn are frequent, but over time, Kuhn’s concepts become common currency. The concept of 
paradigm takes a life of its own, with authors using it without any mention of Kuhn. 
5) Kuhn’s attempt to redefine the concept fails. Kuhn’s attempt to substitute the concept of 
‘paradigm’ by the alternative ‘disciplinary matrix’ is largely ignored by most readers.  
*** 
Kuhn himself recognised that what may explain the popularity of the concepts featured in 
Structure is precisely their interpretive flexibility and their capacity to be filled with different 
meanings. Maasen and Weingart (2000: 78) report that Kuhn said “I have sometimes found it 
hard to believe that all parties to the discussion had been engaged with the same volume”. But 
what or who is to blame for this? It is tempting to blame Kuhn himself. He has been described 
by Fuller (2002) as an author whose discourse can be so obscure that, “[it] makes virtually any 
interpretation look reasonable” (135). We could also argue after Masterman (1970) that if Kuhn 
uses the term ‘paradigm’ in no less than 21 different ways, then it is no surprise if the reader 
does not know exactly which meaning to affix to the term. Although most references to Kuhn’s 
works are to Structure, one thing that can add to the difficulty of being ‘faithful to the 
scriptures’ is the fact that over time, Kuhn changed some of his views in an important way.2 
Arguably, we could also blame Kuhn’s readers for their ‘lazy’ or ‘dishonest’ interpretations, 
but still, ‘misreadings’ do not happen randomly. They are relatively predictable and thus seem 
entirely motivated. For example, in OS, the reading Donaldson (1995) makes of Kuhn’s work 
unsurprisingly supports the view that his own brand of contingency theory should become the 
paradigm for the field (see also: Donaldson, 1999). 
 Between blaming Kuhn and blaming his readers lies a more nuanced explanation. Maasen 
and Weingart suggest that concept transfers are generally metaphorical, and that distortions are 
likely to happen during that process. If the idea of paradigm is a metaphor, then it entails many 
meanings, variously emphasised according to circumstances. New meanings are also allowed 
to emerge, although constrained by older meanings and by the limited number of potential 
meanings any term carries. The interaction of a metaphor within a given discourse, Maasen 
and Weingart say, “[does] not produce non-referential ‘chaos’ but rather (…) introduce[s] new 
semantics and new pragmatics, new knowledge and new world views, even” (34). In the 
interaction between the discourse and the metaphor, some meanings get affixed while some are 
                                                           
2 Stankey (1993) distinguishes at least three phases in Kuhn’s works, each implying a different 
conceptualisation of the notion of incommensurability. 
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ruled away. They add, “Typically, a discourse ‘makes sense’ of a metaphor by incorporating it 
into its discourse specific vocabulary and/or methods, thereby eventually turning the metaphor 
into a familiar concept” (36). Metaphors are thus the site where the production of discourse is 
controlled and organised. Changes in a term like ‘paradigm’ reveal more than changes in the 
lexicon, and semantic ambiguity can be seen not as a failing, but as a rhetorical resource in 
knowledge disputes.   
Ambiguity as a rhetorical resource in knowledge disputes  
A priori, concepts being ambiguous is a bad thing, and commentators have deplored the ill-
defined character of some of the concepts used by organisation scholars (Van Hees & Verweel, 
2006), rendering impossible the design of refutable claims (Donaldson, 1992; McKinley & 
Mone, 1998; Sandelands & Drazin, 1989), or making difficult the production of cumulative 
knowledge (Osigweh, 1989). This treatment of ambiguity is underpinned by the classic 
‘conduit’ metaphor of communication (Putnam, Phillips, & Chapman, 1999): communication 
as a conduit in which a message is transmitted, and encounters various obstacles that need to 
be removed. Whilst useful for analysing breakdowns in communication, this embeds a view of 
ambiguity that obscures its sometimes intentional character. As Putnam et al. (1999) suggest, 
“Ambiguity and misunderstanding of messages are not necessarily breakdowns in 
communication (…) Rather they result from message modification and the need to balance 
relational and political goals” (131). In the study of scientific rhetoric, authors inspired by the 
works of Kenneth Burke tend to understand ambiguity, not as an obstacle to overcome, but as 
a strategic rhetorical resource (e.g. Ceccarelli, 2001). Burke (1945/1969: xviii-xix) paid much 
attention to the ambiguity inherent to language, but simply identifying ambiguity for the sake 
of it is not necessarily a very useful exercise, as a certain level of ambiguity is inevitably present 
with the use of any symbol (including scientific concepts). For Burke, the task of the analyst is 
not “to ‘dispose of’ any ambiguity by merely disclosing the fact that it is an ambiguity”, but 
instead, “to study and clarify the resources of ambiguity” (xix). This means identifying what is 
achieved through the (mis)uses of symbols and the mobilisation of ambiguity. He says, “it is 
in the areas of ambiguity that transformations take place; in fact, without such areas, 
transformation would be impossible” (xix). 
Similarly, the position taken here is that ‘paradigm’ is not a neutral term, but one that can 
carry different meanings, and that can be used for different purposes in a struggle for 
intellectual dominance. In that sense, the definition of ‘paradigm’ (and its companion notion, 
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‘incommensurability’) can be seen as a site where intellectual struggles take place – struggles 
for the definition of what counts as legitimate knowledge, and what does not. What follows 
from this view is that the relationship between paradigms is not much else than the reification 
of the definition that is used. Let us illustrate this key idea with a reading of two texts. 
The usefulness of an arbitrary definition: Two illustrations 
The key idea of this paper is illustrated through a reading of two texts: American Anti-
Management Theories of Organization: A Critique of Paradigm Proliferation, a book by Lex 
Donaldson (1995); and ‘The Re-construction of Organization Studies: Wrestling with 
Incommensurability’, an article by William McKinley and Mark Mone (1998). The first text 
was chosen because it represents a critical case. Over the years, Donaldson has been part of 
numerous discussions on paradigms and metatheoretical issues, and he has systematically 
advocated a literal and ‘orthodox’ reading of Kuhn. That he departs from such literal reading 
shows how easy it is for authors to invest new meanings into already well-used concepts. The 
second text is interesting because McKinley and Mone are preoccupied by the fact that 
concepts are often ambiguous, and they see this ambiguity as a problem – a source of 
incommensurability that renders difficult the adjudication of competing claims. The solution 
they propose – the creation of a dictionary – ultimately shows in an absurd manner the extent 
to which their project is an impossible one. The proposed dictionary is of only use to deal with 
the most narrow kind of incommensurability they have arbitrarily chosen to focus on.  
*** 
Donaldson’s (1995) book is an ambitious one, aiming to find a replacement to what he sees 
as ‘flawed paradigms’ for the study of organisational structures. He deplores that in the last 
decades, there has been an outbreak of new paradigms attacking the position of structural 
contingency theory. He says: “Each of the newer paradigms explicitly or implicitly repudiates 
structural contingency theory” (2), and he thinks that when subjected to scrutiny, those 
paradigms reveal themselves as flawed. This situation exemplifies the problems associated 
with the allegedly excessive fragmentation of the field – a situation he wants to remedy by 
proposing a unifying paradigm. Let us examine what he proposes by looking specifically at the 
meaning his usage of the Kuhnian notions paradigm, incommensurability, and normal vs. 
revolutionary science. 
1) Paradigms. At the beginning of the book, Donaldson identifies four theories that function 
as distinct paradigms: population-ecology theory, resource dependence theory, institutional 
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theory and organisational economics. Anticipating the criticism that the four approaches may 
not really be distinct paradigms, Donaldson adds, “[they] are paradigms in the Kuhnian sense 
that they are mutually antithetic theory statements and languages, which tend to make them 
incommensurable with each other. Each paradigm has its own set of adherents, that is, there 
are distinct paradigm communities” (4). However, the link between Kuhn’s notion and 
Donaldson’s soon become more distant. Donaldson asserts that, “In US organization theory 
there are many new paradigms and newer ones are introduced frequently. Since around 1967 
at least fifteen new paradigms have been launched” (7) [emphasis added]. He also says, “On 
average a new paradigm is offered every second year” (8). The closest Donaldson comes to 
defining the nature of a paradigm is when he explains how structural contingency theory can 
be seen as one: 
Structural contingency theory constituted a research paradigm in that there was a core 
theory (…) and a style of empirical research which featured comparisons of structures and 
contingencies across organizations. Within the broad paradigm there was scope for 
development in the contingencies identified, the structural aspects to which they were 
related, the performance outcomes examined, and refinements in concept and method. (13) 
We recognise here implicit references to Kuhn’s idea of puzzle-solving, the main task that 
concerned organisation researchers working within the framework of structural contingency 
theory. 
2) Incommensurability. Donaldson identifies numerous reasons the four theories mentioned 
above as incommensurable paradigms. For a start, authors from one theory/paradigm 
(Donaldson alternates regularly his choice of term) do not refer much to authors from another 
theory/paradigm. And none of those theories/paradigms offer an extended statement of how it 
relates to the others. What Donaldson seems to say here is that although there is no reason to 
think that theory adjudication is impossible, researchers make it difficult by not engaging with 
each other. Is there anything more that can make the case for incommensurability? Yes: “Each 
[theory] has a somewhat distinct language which would not aid ready inter-theoretical 
discourse and would pose the problem of which language would be used in any new 
integration” (20). Also, “each of the newer theories differs from the others in core theoretical 
propositions, assumptions about organizations, language and methodologies. Each of the 
theories conforms rather closely to the definition of a theoretical paradigm advanced by Kuhn 
(1970)” (21).  
3) Normal vs. revolutionary science. This is perhaps where the task of conciliating Kuhn’s 
view and Donaldson’s is at its most difficult. Donaldson suggests that the newer paradigms all 
represent forms of revolutionary science: 
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In none of the three newer theories is there much attempt to accommodate previous 
structural contingency theory or to present the newer theory as complementing the older 
theory by adding to prior work so that a more complete explanation of structure is obtained. 
The approach is not the eclectic or synthesizing or integrative one of building upon an 
earlier model and showing how the new model explains more variance in organizational 
structure or in other dependent variables. (….) Hence each of the three newer 
organizational theories potentially constitutes a paradigm revolution. (17)  
Trying to clarify how this represents a Kuhnian revolution, Donaldson adds: 
Thus the paradigm-revolutionary nature of the newer organizational theories means that 
there is a disjunction or break in the way the field thinks about organizations. This poses 
problems of integration and cumulation. At the theoretical level there is no scheme which 
unifies old and new (that is functional and political) and makes the field coherent by 
offering a picture of how all of these variables and processes go together. Nor would it be 
easy to somehow construct such a unified theory as the base-assumptions are antagonistic, 
(…) This is the price of paradigm revolution in any science, (…). Paradigm revolution 
becomes a major impediment to serious integration of thought—unless some paradigm 
completely triumphs over the other, that is, the paradigm revolution is successful. (17-18) 
Overall, Donaldson’s text shows how a reasonable argument can be developed upon 
questionable premises that rely on the ambiguity and polysemy of the key concepts used. 
Donaldson uses Kuhn’s language and evokes various links between his version of the concepts 
and Kuhn’s, but he also seems aware of the metaphorical nature of the transferred concepts, 
keeping a safe distance from them: theories can be seen as paradigms, and those paradigms 
can be seen as incommensurable. 
*** 
McKinley and Mone (1998) initiated a controversy when they suggested that the ambiguity 
of the concepts used by organisation researchers is a major obstacle to advances in knowledge, 
and is one major reason for persistent incommensurability between theoretical perspectives. In 
line with what they are arguing, they are careful to confine their claim to a specific form of 
incommensurability – what is generally labelled ‘semantic incommensurability’ (Harris, 2005) 
– between a set of North-American theories. They do not claim to be tackling the broader 
question of paradigm incommensurability.  
McKinley and Mone argue there are many theories that are in contradiction, and that if two 
incompatible claims can be made, it is because they carry enough ambiguity to be impossible 
to refute. Ambiguity, they say, “makes it difficult to conduct conclusive empirical tests and to 
compare incommensurable schools of thought”. In sum, “[it] renders theory non-falsiable” 
(175). This ambiguity, they suggest, “makes conclusive empirical assessment of any theoretical 
school equivalent to punching a marshmallow” (176). What sparked controversy here was the 
solution proposed: “the democratic creation of a construct dictionary (…) [that] would include 
definitions of key organization studies terms, and would also provide suggestions for 
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operationalizing those constructs so as to create valid measures of them” (176-177). In their 
view, the main advantage of such a dictionary would be that “[it] would provide a theory-
neutral observation language that could help reduce the incommensurability between 
organization studies school of thought” (180). This is because “Measures based on construct 
definitions in the dictionary would draw on a field-wide consensus, so results derived by using 
those measures would have broader legitimacy than results based on the particularistic 
construct definitions and measures typical of organization studies research projects today” 
(180).  
Leaving aside the philosophical issues raised by this position, in the spirit of McKinley and 
Mone’s suggestion, one could wonder whether debates about paradigms in OS would really be 
facilitated by establishing a dictionary entry that would affix a permanent and stable meaning 
to concepts such as ‘paradigm’ and ‘incommensurability’. Let us note this irony: if McKinley 
and Mone would have had to rely on any of the conceptualisations of incommensurability that 
are generally used in OS, they would not have been able to express their argument in the first 
place. This was noted in a response by Booth (1998) who suggested indeed that their argument 
makes sense only because they use a peculiar and arbitrary definition of incommensurability. 
Once again, like with the previous text, the argumentation developed is only coherent if we 
accept in the first place the arbitrary choices made by the author. What McKinley and Mone’s 
(1998) use of the notion of incommensurability shows is that attempts to legislate over the 
meanings of concepts, or even merely to reach a temporarily stable shared understanding are 
likely to encounter major difficulties. This is to be expected given the importance of the 
meaning of concepts as a site of struggle for the intellectual control and dominance of the field. 
Ultimately, McKinley and Mone show in an absurd manner that their project is an impossible 
one.  
Conclusion 
Expunging ambiguity can be virtuous in some cases, but often it is a fantasy that sidesteps 
the fact that actors have important and legitimate stakes in the definitions they affix to concepts. 
We do need to acknowledge that concepts are naturally ambiguous, and that this is probably 
inevitable, and not such a bad thing. Like others who have highlighted the need for interpretive 
flexibility in the invention of innovative arguments (e.g. Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Sköldberg, 
1992), Gergen (1998) responded to McKinley and Mone that expunging ambiguity is 
unrealistic and undesirable: 
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Because languages are living and evolving systems, because words carry multiple 
meanings, even the dictionary police would have trouble in discriminating between who 
has adhered to, as opposed to violated, the rules of the game. Eventually everyone in the 
profession who received a ‘ticket’ would seek to get it ‘fixed’ or become outlaws. And the 
outlaws, I suggest, would profit in the end—because they would have new and exciting 
things to say. (277-278) 
Still, one may retort that ambiguity can really hamper the possibility of meaningful discussions. 
Here Watson does exactly that when he deplores how authors use the term ‘positivism’:  
One almost cries out here for a knocking together of heads and a demand that people in 
the field sort out just what they want to apply their labels to. Different positions could 
continue to be adopted, but at least we would know what precisely people were talking 
about when they debate those positions. (380) 
In my view, the problem that Watson is highlighting is not only ambiguity and polysemy, but 
probably a lack of goodwill. Taking a different example – the contested concept of culture – 
we can imagine how to even propose that a dictionary could settle its meaning is as 
intellectually offensive as it is unrealistic. The best one can hope for is a clearer 
acknowledgement of the polysemic nature of most concepts that are central to our endeavours, 
and in the case of the paradigm debate in OS, a recognition of the role played by ambiguity in 
that debate.   
 
Figure 1: Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory 
The sociology of radical change 
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‘Radical humanist’ ‘Radical Structuralist’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objective 
 
‘Interpretative’ ‘Functionalist’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sociology of regulation 
 
From Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
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